CHIEF JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON AS
TEACHER: OBSERVATIONS BY A
SOMETIME COLLABORATOR
ANDREW S. WATSONt

One of the social roles of a court is to participate in teaching the community what its law is. As judges write opinions, they
construe statutes and prior decisions and these views then become part of the teaching materials for the next cycle of learning. In addition, and to varying degrees, judges participate in
extra-judicial teaching. This kind of activity is more controversial, and many argue that it is inappropriate and prejudicial to
a judge's courtroom function.' Whatever value judgment one
makes on this point, all would have to agree that Judge David L.
Bazelon, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, has been very active in extra-judicial teaching.
Some of this activity is directed toward the legal profession, and
some toward the "helping professions" of psychiatry, psychology,
and social work. I have had the opportunity to participate and
to observe at close hand some of Judge Bazelon's teaching activities with the latter group, and in this Article I will focus mainly
upon that area of his work and make a psychiatrist's observations
about it.
We do not yet have an assembled volume of Judge Bazelon's
writings, but his publications are sufficiently extensive to qualify
him to join Coke, Blackstone, Holmes, Cardozo, and Jerome
Frank as promulgators of explicit jurisprudential views about a
multitude of legal questions. Inspection of Judge Bazelon's published extra-judicial works gives ample evidence of the wide
t Professor of Psychiatry and Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1942,
University of Michigan; M.D. 1950, MM.S 1954, Temple University.
I The inquiries regarding what constitutes a proper judicial function are well
known. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 62-80 (1924); Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on Reading Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947). For an analysis of
the conscious-logical as well as some of the unconscious factors which affect the way
courts approach their activism, see K. LLEWELLYN. THE CO.INONLAw TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS

77-91 (1960).
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range of his jurisprudential explorations. 2 I am particularly
happy to contribute to this issue because I had the pleasure and
stimulation of participating with Judge Bazelon as co-teacher
early in his career as educator.
I. SOME TEACHING EXPERIENCES
My own experience in legal education began in 1955, shortly
3
after Judge Bazelon's famous opinion in Durham v. United States.
As I was groping to understand the ways in which psychiatrists
and lawyers related to each other professionally, I encountered
Douglas v. United States.4 I had already come to the conclusion
that much of the intellectual commerce between these two professions could only be characterized as uncommunicative, mainly
because neither group seemed to grasp the major concepts and
concerns of the other. Douglas struck me instantly as an exciting
exception to the kind of discussion I had come to expect. I had
occasion to write Judge Bazelon and, having learned of the availability of "slip opinions," I requested a copy of Douglas. In doing
so, I commented on the unusual quality of the opinion from the
standpoint of its understanding of psychiatric issues. By return
mail I received a copy of the opinion and a nice note from Judge
Bazelon suggesting that sometime if I were in Washington, we
should get together. Before opportunity took me to Washington, I received a phone call one Saturday afternoon from the
judge, stating that he was visiting a friend in Philadelphia and
inviting me to join him for a drink, which I did. We had an interesting and productive conversation discussing areas of mutual interest, and that was the beginning of my friendship with
Judge Bazelon.
2 See, e.g., Bazelon, Follow the Yellow Brick Road, 40 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 562

(1970); Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1969);
Bazelon, Justice Stumbles on Science, 1 IRISH JURIST 273 (n.s. 1966); Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Civil Liberties, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 13 (1964); Bazelon, Mental Retardation: Some
Legal and Moral Considerations, 35 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 838 (1965); Bazelon, New
Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in A Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 653 (1971);
Bazelon, Racism, Classism, and the Juvenile Process, 53 JUDICATURE 373 (1970); Bazelon,
The Concept of Responsibility, 53 GEO. L.J. 5 (1964); Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of
Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Bazelon, The Interface of Law and the Behavioral
Sciences, 271 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1141 (1966); Bazelon, The Law and the Mentally Ill,125
AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 665 (1968); Bazelon, "The Problem Child"--Whose Problem?, 13 J. CHILD
PSYCHIAT. 193 (1974); Bazelon, The Right to Treatment: The Court's Role, 20 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIAT.

129 (1969).

3 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

4 239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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I had just completed my second year of teaching at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and was becoming intrigued
with the problems of a lawyer's education, especially as it relates
to the psychology of the professional self image. 5 One of the
things I surmised from that meeting with Judge Bazelon was that
he shared this interest, though he had had no formal experience
as a teacher. It happened that at that particular time we needed
a lawyer teaching collaborator for my seminars in the law school.
My original co-teacher had departed and there was no great eagerness among my professorial colleagues to join in that venture.
Following my discussion with Judge Bazelon, I suggested to the
faculty that possibly he might be available to teach the seminar
with me in the fall term. This met with their approval, and we
contacted him. He accepted, and for one semester in each of the
following two years he came weekly to Philadelphia to co-teach
a seminar in Law and Psychiatry. Though I have referred to this
seminar elsewhere, 6 it warrants a brief summary here.
The materials that we used in that seminar were the early
draft versions of what was ultimately to become Psychiatry for
Lawyers.7 We had been experimenting with ways and means to
utilize psychiatric concepts in the legal context, because it seemed
clear that there had been little appropriate utilization of psychiatric information in law theretofore. Judge Bazelon shared myeagerness to help students develop this skill. We were convinced
that no amount of theoretical exploration or discussion, by itself,
would enable students to utilize psychiatric data skillfully and
appropriately. For this reason, by the second year's seminar offering we had evolved an interesting alternative technique. Judge
Bazelon obtained a number of trial transcripts of cases which
came before his court dealing with various psychiatric questions.
Most of them related to problems around the defense of insanity. Instead of having students write a term paper, four students were assigned to one of those cases, one pair to serve as
counsel for appellant and one pair as counsel for appellee. Each
team would then write a brief and prepare to argue it. At the
end of the semester we scheduled a two-day visit to Washing-

'See

generally, Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REv. 392 (1971);
Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91 (1968).

' See Watson, Reflections on the Teaching of Criminal Law, 37 U. DET. L.J. 701, 715
(1960).
7 A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (1968).
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ton where moot court arguments on these cases would be heard
in the Court of Appeals Courtroom, before a bench which included Judge Bazelon, Judge Washington, Mr. Abe Fortas, the
then Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff, and myself. Coupled with
this advocacy experience in arguing mental health issues, we
had an afternoon seminar on juvenile delinquency at the National Institute of Mental Health, taught by the internationally
famous expert, Dr. Fritz Redl. 8 On the morning of the second
day, we visited the John Howard Pavilion at St. Elizabeths Hospital, where students had the opportunity to interview several of
the defendants in the D.C. Circuit cases including Wells, Leach,
and Carter, 9 as well as some of the doctors who had served as psychiatric expert witnesses. This permitted them to verify explicitly the impressions they gained from the trial records about the
status and capacities of the defendants, as well as the skills of the
experts involved in the trials. The students conducted themselves
with a skill which compared well with that demonstrated by
many, if not most, of the counsel who originally participated in
the litigation of those cases. At luncheon that day, students sat
at four-place tables, each of which had three students and a person such as a judge from the court of appeals, the late Dr. Winfred Overholser, superintendent of St. Elizabeths, or some other
illustrious person involved in the development of the case law
on mental illness in the District of Columbia.
Needless to say, this seminar generated an excitement which
I have rarely seen duplicated. I am sure those students will
never forget that experience, and all of them gained, among
other things, a vivid image of the ways Judge Bazelon viewed
psychiatric concepts and psychiatric expert testimony, as well as
the way he viewed his role and function as a judge. In every class
session Judge Bazelon's probing concern about the nature of
psychiatric theory, data, and the way they should be presented
in court was highly visible and evocative. It has always been clear
to me that I learned as much as anyone in that seminar.
While Judge Bazelon was teaching with me, we established
a series of seminar meetings among the University of Pennsyl8 For his views on delinquent behavior, see F.

REDL

& D.

WINEMAN,

CHILDREN

WHo HATE (1951).
1 Wells v. United States, 239 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Overholser v. Leach, 257
F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1958); Carter v. United States, 252
F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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vania Law School faculty. Those members who wished to attend
met approximately every second or third week at my home for
an evening bull session with Judge Bazelon and myself. Drawn
by the presence of Judge Bazelon, most attended fairly regularly, and it was in this situation that I first came to appreciate the
skill of Judge Bazelon as a persuader-negotiator. My faculty colleagues could hardly be characterized as timid or reluctant debaters, and it fascinated me to observe the way in which the Judge
could get them to consider his fairly unusual and unorthodox
approaches to such issues as criminal responsibility. Those faculty
seminars provided an interesting supplement to the activities of
that year, and foreshadowed the considerable skill which Dave
Bazelon would come to deploy as a teacher.
In subsequent years, I have had many opportunities to hear
Judge Bazelon lecture and discuss matters of interest to psychiatrists. His involvement with the substance of psychiatric information as it relates to law has become widely known throughout
the world, and nearly every working psychiatrist has some familiarity with him and his ideas. Though he is often critical of
the psychiatric profession, he never fails to catch its attention
and make it seriously consider the problems he poses. In a recent issue of PsychiatricNews, an article describing his lecture to
the American Psychiatric Association entitled The Perils of Wizidry opened with the statement, "At its own invitation, psychiatry once again had its tail twisted by Judge David Bazelon of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."'10 The lecture reflected Judge Bazelon's continuing efforts to teach psychiatrists about the way their information is utilized by the legal
system. The propositions he posed are similar to those he has
raised consistently for years. The fact that he is still invited to
participate in this "teaching" is testimony to the esteem in which
he is held by the psychiatric profession, despite the fact that he
often takes it to task. This esteem is so great that in 1969 he was
elected President of the American Orthopsychiatric Association,
an important professional group whose membership embraces
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, teachers, and lawyers. When he was elected to that office he was added to the
roster of a leadership-elite."
10Psychiatric News, June 19, 1974, at 20, col. 1.
" For a description of Judge Bazelon by a leading psychiatric educator, see Eisen-
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I had another opportunity to observe Judge Bazelon's teaching skill many years ago in a seminar at the federal hospital in
Springfield, Missouri, where most of the government's competency-to-stand-trial evaluations were carried out. The subjects of
the seminar included criminal responsibility and competency to
stand trial, and those attending included such notables as Dr.
Karl Menninger. The discussions made it clear that few of the
psychiatrists present understood the legal questions which were
central to the evaluations carried out by the hospital, while on the
other hand, Judge Bazelon was very familiar with the psychiatric propositions put forward. For that reason, it was he who
placed problems in appropriate perspective and I suspect that,
had he not been there, the seminar would have been just one
more example of communication failure between lawyers and
psychiatrists.
Judge Bazelon has often reiterated that the only way the
complex problems involving law and psychiatry can ever be resolved is for the members of both professions to understand each
other's problems well enough that they can be appropriately considered by courts. For this reason, in addition to his work with
psychiatrists, he has been involved in the development of learning experiences for the judiciary. During the course of our teaching collaboration in Philadelphia, I was involved in one of his
efforts to bring psychiatric information to his colleagues on the
bench. On this occasion he obtained two movies which explored
institutional psychiatric care, and showed them to the Justices of
the Supreme Court and to the judges of the District of Columbia
court of appeals. Their content provided an opportunity for the
judges to discuss some of the treatment principles involved. I
would speculate that it has been necessary for Judge Bazelon to
engage extensively in this kind of activity over the years, in order
to enable his colleagues on the bench to plunge as deeply and as
skillfully as they have into the many psychiatric issues with which
their opinions have dealt. Judge Bazelon's leadership in developing this sensitivity is surely one of the reasons he will be held in
high esteem for a long time to come. No other court has ever
carried out such a meticulous dissection of the issues, nor provided so much information about how to deal appropriately with
berg, Judge David Bazelon, 39 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 372 (1969). The essay also enumerates Bazelon's many honors and accomplishments up to the time of its publication.

1974]

JUDGE BAZELON AS TEACHER

psychiatric matters. Its explicit formulation of a new rule for
criminal responsibility is inconsequential as compared with the
multitude of procedural questions with which it has dealt. 12 This
Article will do little more than allude to these cases, which have
been discussed extensively in Judge Bazelon's many lectures and
articles.
There can be little doubt that Judge Bazelon views himself
as a judicial "activist." Examination of the many issues he has explored in his lectures will readily confirm this opinion. I would
like to look at the substance of some of these views and react to
them from the viewpoint of a psychiatrist.
II.

OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE JUDICIAL ROLE

Perhaps one of the most controversial issues dividing physicians and lawyers relates to the evaluation of medical opinions.
This concerns not only the medical profession's involvements
with litigation, but also its relationship to society in general. Physicians more than any other group of experts have resisted the
notion that a nonexpert could have the capacity to look at their
activities and make sensible judgments about them. This attitude
comes into sharp visibility in relation to all expert medical testimony, but especially in relation to expert psychiatric testimony.
Judge Bazelon, in his court opinions and lectures, has made
many suggestions which could help resolve this problem, if they
were better understood. Based on his observation that one function of a court is "monitoring the decisional process,"' 13 he has
consistently and persistently pointed out the importance of having psychiatric expert witnesses describe the data which they
have utilized in reaching their judgments in language sufficiently
comprehensible to laymen so that the factfinders can decide
whether or not the experts have skillfully and rationally carried
out their work. He notes that courts evaluate everything else from
environmental biology to nuclear physics. Why should they not
do likewise with psychiatry? 1 4 This proposition was stated ex12 Watson, Durham Plus Five Years: Development of the Law of Criminal Responsibility
in the District of Columbia, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 289 (1959). See also A. GOLDSTEIN,
THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967).
13 Bazelon, Psychiatristsand the Adversary Process, Sc. Am., June 1974, at 18.
14See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 743
(1969). See also Bazelon, supra note 13, at 18.
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plicitly in Carter v. United States,15 and later repeated in Washington v. United States.1 6 At least in the District of Columbia, any
lawyer who presents expert psychiatric evidence in his case without clearly laying out the data from which the opinion was drawn
stands a serious risk of reversal if the case goes to the court of
appeals.
Judge Bazelon also notes that courts probably have to function in the role of "muckraker."' 7 By this he means that courts
should file constant complaints about society's shortcomings and
its failure to deliver what it promises.' 8 This proposition is well
illustrated in the landmark case of Rome v. Cameron,1 9 which
raised the question of right to treatment and which has led to a
rapidly pyramiding literature, and very possibly some entirely
new techniques of medical management. These matters will be
discussed further below.
Finally, Judge Bazelon understands the fact that courts have
the function of reconciling irreconcilable differences. 20 Judges
must fulfill society's need to have somebody who will "bite the
bullet," and Bazelon's court has demonstrated over and over
again its willingness to do so. In the area of mental health care
there is a multitude of technical issues which everyone regards
21
as difficult and presently not susceptible to scientific settlement.
Nevertheless the District of Columbia court of appeals has dealt
with these matters successfully in its opinions. The case law of
that court reflects a kind of social experimentation in which
15252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
16 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
17 Bazelon, supra note 14, at 749.

"SThis point was made in an address delivered to the National Council of Juvenile
Court Judges in Atlanta, Georgia on July 6, 1970. See Bazelon, Beyond Control of the
Juvenile Court, 21 Juv. CT. JUDGESJ. 42, 44-45 (1970).
19 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
20Bazelon, supra note 13, at 19.
21 For example: (1) what are the appropriate treatment methods for various types
of mental illness at various stages of development and remission? (2) How do you
handle the "shifting" levels of competency in patients undergoing psychotherapy?
(3) What is the competency of a patient who is on anti-psychotic medication? (4) Can
persons with the diagnosis of "personality disorder, anti-social type," be treated effectively? Under what conditions? (5) Can effective psychotherapy be carried out with
a non-voluntary patient? (6) How do you handle the consent for treatment question
with adolescents from ages thirteen to eighteen, when they wish to take a different
course of action from their parents? (7) Can children who will have learning or behavior
difficulties in the future be predicted? Can they be treated to prevent such a difficulty?
(8) Can future homicidal behavior be predicted? How much over-prediction or underprediction will there be? Can such a proclivity be altered preventively?
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various hypotheses have been raised, considered, experimented
with in various themes and variations, and then sometimes discarded, as was the Durham rule for insanity. If the holdings of
that court had been given in a stark, conclusory form, they
would not have been half as useful as they are. In the best common law tradition, Judge Bazelon and his brothers- explore meticulously, and then explain how and why they arrive at their
decisions. These opinions have been very useful in helping psychiatrists know what is expected of them in their courtroom
participation. Just as effective expert testimony is free of technical jargon, these opinions have the merit of being comprehensible to nonlawyers, and so may be used by them to sharpen
their participation.
A. Lawyers, Judges, and the Community's Mental Health Activities
Judge Bazelon's interest in psychological processes inevitably led him into discussions regarding the roles and behavior
of lawyers, and to consider legal education in general. In his 1973
Marx Lectures at the University of Cincinnati, 22 while discussing
specifically the legal issues about the right to effective counsel,
he put forward the idea that lawyers should broaden their approach to clients, in order to help them to deal with all of the
problems which emerge during the unfolding of a case:
Someone in the system of justice must be concerned
with the whole man, rather than just with whether he
committed a particular act. That person is counsel. This
is not to say that counsel himself must be a social worker
psychologist, job counselor and the like. Rather, by being
sensitive to his client's needs, concerned with him as a
person and aware of available resources,
counsel can
23
bring the client to those resources.
Knowing how to be helpful in these ways would not only be a
great service to clients, but it would also help the attorney deal
with the legal work. A lawyer must engage constantly in a datagathering process with his clients, and his psychological skill and
understanding will either add to or subtract from his ability to
make sense of their problems. Legal concepts such as mens rea,
22
23

Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1973).
Id. 46.
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scienter, neglect, intent, knowledge, purpose, and a host of others
all have psychological elements which must be understood if
counsel is to deal with them effectively. 24 Such understanding is
especially important in such areas as family law, where it is common knowledge that counsel often function poorly.25
It is crucial that lawyers begin to acquire these skills. In fact,
knowledge about interviewing technique is now so well established that in just a few years ineptitude in this area should be
considered a basis for legal malpractice. Just as it may be negligent for a doctor to fail to discover a patient's illness, so it should
be for a lawyer whose client comes in with a "diagnosible" problem and the finding is not made. Judge Bazelon's suggestion that
lawyers expand their role is appropriate and highly desirable.
Having recognized the importance of these skills, lawyers
still disagreed on the means of acquiring them. Only a few years
ago it was argued vigorously that they could not be taught effectively in law schools, and that they were not an appropriate
academic goal in any case. Because of this, such matters were
left to be learned during the early years of law practice.2 6 Recent concerns about lawyers' professional behavior, however, coupled with a considerable demand from law students, have led to
an increased interest in, and attention to, "clinical teaching" in
the law schools. 2 7 By 1972, with considerable financial support
from the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR), more than 105 of the 147 ABA-approved law
schools had instituted courses which provide practice experience under teaching supervision. 28 Although these programs
are a step in the right direction, they still fall far short of providing the kind of learning experience which will help a lawyer
24 In the trial context, Bazelon notes, "If an important issue escapes without ex-

posure to that adversary process, then it is fair to say that the assistance of counsel
has been ineffective, in the sense that it failed to produce a full-fledged public adversary trial." Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society,

46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 653, 671 (1971).

15 See Pilpel, The Job the Lawyers Shirk, HARPERS MAGAZINE, January 1960, at 67.

26 For an excellent summary of these issues, see Boyer & Cramton, American Legal

Education: An Agendafor Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221 (1974).
27 These concerns arose well before Watergate and its aftermath. However, the

frightening spectacle of lawyer behavior in that episode has done nothing to lessen
the concern. In fact, such concern provided the subject for many law school graduation
addresses in 1974. I gave one such at the University of Pittsburgh. See Watson, The
Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An EducationalDeficiency Disease, 26 J. LEGAL ED. 441 (1974).
28 See Brickman, CLEPR and Clinical Education: A Review and Analysis, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT

56, 60 (1973).
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become an "advocate for the whole man." In Judge Bazelon's
words: "Only if counsel becomes a 'counselor' is there any hope
for making the [legal] system's goal humanistic rather than
29
mechanistic.
Counsel must see to it that his client's individual needs
will not be overwhelmed by the system's own pressing
need for administrative efficiency. Counsel must be the
medium of reconciliation ....
Such an expanded role
may not be constitutionally mandated, but it may well
30
be a moral imperative. It is the humane thing to do.
When a law faculty moves in the direction of providing
clinical education, however, it instantly encounters the need
to reevaluate curricular content. At that point the tremendous
diversification of law practice forces some kind of choice in
content-focus, which in turn reinforces the controversial trend
toward the specialization of the bar. Judge Bazelon is not overly
disturbed by this. In the context of criminal practice, he stated:
In spite of the myth that all lawyers are generalists, criminal defense is a speciality. It requires a skilled trial advocate who is familiar with the criminal justice system, including not only the criminal code but also police and
prosecutorial practices, the availability of local experts
and private crime labs and the informal norms of the
criminal courts. 1
He urges that a system for certifying specialists in criminal practice be developed, 32 and he endorses "the idea of moving students out of the classroom and into supervised programs of internship in the criminal justice system. 3 3 If this clinical trend
continues to develop, it will lead to the incorporation of skill training in interpersonal techniques as they relate to the counselor's
role.3 4 Then legal education will not only prepare law students
to deal with their clients as whole persons, but it will also help
Bazelon, supra note 22, at 45.
30 Id. 46.
31 Id. 12.
32
Id. 18-19.
33 Id. 19.
34 See Watson, On Teaching Lauyers Professionalism: A Continuing Psychiatric Analysis, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 139 (1973); Watson, Professionalizing the Layer's Role as Counselor: Risk-Taking for Rewards, 1 LAw & Soc. ORDER 17
(1969).
29
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them to be whole people themselves as they work with their clients. This could have a substantial positive effect on the very
standards of professional behavior which have been so scrutinized
35
in the light of Watergate and its aftermath.
In analyzing the court's role in mental health activities, Judge
Bazelon has made many observations about the "preventive"
nature of the judicial system. For example, in a discussion about
enlarging the judicial system, he said:
No matter how much we expand our judicial resources,
the courts cannot be the primary agancy we rely upon to
solve our problems ....

But what the courts can do is

take the time necessary to see to it that the other institutions are in fact doing what they are supposed to.
This, I think, is the most important function of courts
in a democratic society. ...
S. . The true measure of the quality of a judicial sys-

tem is how many hidden problems it brings into public
view and how well it stimulates the responsible officials
and agencies into doing something about these problems.

36

He made the same point in a talk to juvenile court judges:
The battle against juvenile crime can't possibly be
won in court, even in the most enlightened court. That
is only where we bring the worst casualties and hope
that some, with good care, will survive, albeit with scars
and crippling disabilities. The name of the game is Prevention, and that's the job for the institutions in the
community that can help children without stigmatizing
them, without labeling them delinquents and saddling
them with a court record for the rest of their lives. The
institutions that can handle that job may not exist. But
it's up to you to call attention to the need, and not to go
37
on pretending you can do the job yourselves.
These comments about a court's preventive function parallel one
of the important new social strategies of psychiatry, that of Community Mental Health. The touchstones of this approach are
appropriate utilization of resources and the development of pre3 See Watson, supra note 27.
3 Bazelon, supra note 24, at 654-655.
37 Bazelon, supra note 18, at 44.
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vention methods. Judge Bazelon has spoken of these concepts
in several of his lectures to both psychiatrists and lawyers. In his
New York University Law School address he said: "The way to
make medical care more 'efficient' is to keep people from getting sick in the first place. And the way to make courts more 'efficient' is to deal with the factors that cause people to commit
their crimes. '3 8 He carried this point further in his Presidential
Address to the American Orthopsychiatric Association in 1970.
He described a "'trouble center' . . . where people in the community can take all their problems, from an inadequate welfare
check or a landlord's failure to make repairs, to a personality
39
conflict at work or at home.
The "trouble center" represents a conscious departure from the medical model for community mental
health services. It is designed to give the center an image
much more attractive to consumers than that of a traditional mental health facility. In this way the center may
be able to reach deeper into the heart of the troubled
community. If some of the people come in with problems outside the realm of traditional mental health concerns, the center can always call on lawyers or anyone
40
else in the community who is willing and able to help.
We see in these comments another example of the unconventional and creative Bazelon view of how the legal system might function in relation to the community's needs.
In exploring concepts of community mental health strategy,
Judge Bazelon is not unaware of the need to delineate the respective roles of the various participants, as well as the rights of
client-patients.
If we are going to lock up our old people, or our ugly
people, or anyone else, we should do it without leaning
on you [mental health professionals] ....
The point is this: if you see someone drowning, and you think you can save him, you do it, but that
38 Bazelon, supra note 24, at 660.
39 Bazelon, Follow the Yellow Brick Road, 40 AM. J.
40

Id.

ORTHOPSYCHIAT.

562, 565 (1970).
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doesn't mean that mental health
professionals should
41
become full-time lifeguards.
He also applies these principles when he urges the desirability
of keeping children within the school system for treatment, rather than spewing them out after applying some kind of psychopathological or legal label. 4 2 If society and those concerned with
mental health are to adopt his recommended course of action,
many traditional roles must change. This in turn will stir the parties involved to resist. Dealing successfully with such resistance
lies at the center of any successful project for social change.4 3
Finally, Judge Bazelon is sensitive to the uses of personnel
in consultative roles, dedicated to warding off problems before
they occur.
If it works, this kind of indirect action maximizes the effectiveness of the mental health professionals, who are
in short supply, without leading society to rely too heavily on their expertise. I see in consultation the success
of the Wizard of Oz. He helped the Scarecrow discover
his own wisdom, the Tin Woodman his emotions, and
helped the Cowardly Lion to know what courage really
is. Dorothy was quite beyond his powers, because it took
real magic to get her home to Kansas. But as for the
44
others, he helped them to build on what they already had.
This concept of consulation has been applied to enrich the function of lawyers in mental health settings. For example, one of
Judge Bazelon's former law clerks, Professor Robert A. Burt,
my teaching colleague on the University of Michigan Law Faculty,
has been appointed to the Psychiatry Faculty in the Medical
School. He frequently consults with us about the legal problems
involving the troubled children and their families whom we treat
at the Children's Psychiatric Hospital. Although this consultation is only one year old, it has already produced a marked improvement in the ways we help our juvenile patients and their
families. At first, Professor Burt's presence and views were seen
as a threat to the treatment process, a reaction which was totally
predictable. But now his contributions are eagerly sought, freely
41 Id.

563-64.
Bazelon, supra note 18, at 44-45.
Id. 45, 50.
44 Bazelon, supra note 39, at 566 (emphasis added).
42
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used, and enthusiastically applauded by staff and trainees alike.
Professor Burt is only one of an impressive list of experts on
law and psychiatry who formerly served as law clerks to Judge
Bazelon. This list includes Dean Abraham Goldstein and Professor Joseph Goldstein of the Yale Law School, and Professor
Alan Dershowitz of the Harvard Law School. These men have
developed extensive expertise in psychological matters as related to law, and they have each made substantial contributions
to our understanding in this field. Certainly it does not strain
credulity to attribute some of their interest and motivations to
the work they did with and for Judge Bazelon. These, his "graduate students," bear witness to his pedagogical effectiveness; and,
as all students do, they add to the lustre and stature of their
teacher.
B.

Criminal Responsibility and Its Related Issues

At least among behavioral scientists, criminal responsibility is
probably the area of law for which Judge Bazelon is most widely
known. The court's discontent with the insanity defense was telegraphed in Tatum v. United States, 45 where it expressed discontent
with the M'Naghten46 test of insanity and observed that it would
probably consider a change of rule in a future case. Then in 1954,
47
Bazelon wrote his landmark opinion in Durham v. United States,
reflecting the depth of his consideration and study of criminal
responsibility and psychiatric theory and practice, an understanding which has now become quite extensive. In fact, an excellent handbook on psychiatric expert testimony could be assembled from his opinions (as well as those of his colleagues)
which involve criminal responsibility and its collateral issues.
When the Durham test for criminal responsibility was handed
down, it was clear that one of its main purposes was to facilitate
and improve psychiatric expert testimony. As Judge Bazelon
has noted, the previous tests of M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" were seemingly clear legal definitions; however,
[t]here was just one small problem. The psychiatrists
who had to testify about the defendant's mental condition insisted that the tests we were using had no basis
45 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
46Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
47 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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in reality. They said that mental illness could be disabling in a variety of ways that ought to amount to excusing
conditions but that it virtually never destroyed the abstract capacity to distinguish right from wrong-or if it
did, the psychiatrist had no way of knowing it. The court
was finally persuaded that the existing tests were unsatisfactory, that they didn't correspond either to psychiatric
reality or to commonly held notions of responsibility and
excuse. But no one had a very clear idea of what to substitute for the old test. It would have been nice to find a
new formula, one that more clearly expressed what was
wanted as a matter of law, but we didn't quite know what
was wanted. All we knew was that we needed more information about human behavior. We therefore decided
to try a rule that sounded very simple. In Durham we
said that a defendant would not be responsible if his
act had been the product of mental illness. That left
it to the psychiatrists to testify in the terms
they knew
48
best and to tell the jury as much as they could.
It was hoped that his formulation would permit experts to
present testimony in their own language, devoid of the strictures
about which they had been complaining for so long. Regrettably,
this did not occur. 49 The language and content of psychiatric expert testimony in the cases tried in the District of Columbia continued to ring with all of its previous hollow formulations, and
the court of appeals began to complain of it. For example, in
Carter v. United States,50 the court stated:
Mental "disease" means mental illness. Mental illnesses are of many sorts and have many characteristics.
They, like physical illnesses, are the subject matter of
medical science. They differ widely in origin, in characteristics, and in their effects on a person's mental processes, his abilities, and his behavior. To make a reasonable inference concerning the relationship between a
disease and a certain act, the trier of the facts must be
informed with some particularity. This must be done by
testimony. Unexplained medical labels-schizophrenia,
paranoia, psychosis, neurosis, psychopathy-are not
enough. Description and explanation of the origin, de4' Bazelon, supra note

24, at 657-58 (emphasis added).

41 See Watson, supra note 12.
50 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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velopment and manifestations of alleged disease are the
chief functions of the expert witness. The chief value
of an expert's testimony in this field, as in all other fields,
rests upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by which he progresses from
his material to his conclusion; in the explanation of the
disease and its dynamics, that is, how it occurred, developed, and affected the mental and emotional processes of the defendant; it does not lie in his mere expression of conclusion. The ultimate inferences vel non
of relationship, of cause and effect, are for the trier of
the facts. 51
This same idea is echoed in Bazelon's recent Scientific American
article:
In the end, after 18 years, I favored the abandonment of the Durham rule because in practice it had failed
to take the issue of criminal responsibility away from
the experts. Psychiatrists continued to testify to the
naked conclusion instead of providing information
about the accused so that the jury could render the ultimate moral judgment about blameworthiness. Durham
52
had secured little improvement over M'Naghten.
At another point in the same article, Judge Bazelon wrote:
What psychiatrists have not understood is that conclusory labels are no substitute in judicial proceedings
for facts derived from disciplined investigation. Labeling a person "schizophrenic" does not make him so! Although the law must settle for an "educated guess," that
guess is only as good as the investigation, the facts and
the reasoning that underpin it.5 3
In a 1966 address given at University College in Dublin,
Bazelon asked:
Why is the psychiatrist prone to give the court his
diagnostic conclusion and little more? Basically, I often
suspect, because he has little more to give. Our society
has been unwilling to divert enough of its scarce re51 Id. at 617. The opinion was written by Judge Prettyman, although I suspect
that this part of it might have come from the hand of Judge Bazelon. At least, as noted,
it rings of concepts he has often articulated.
52 Bazelon, supra note 13, at 21.
53

Id. 20.
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sources to the study of those who are charged with
crime. This goes to the root of our social system. Our
psychiatrists may not be devoted entirely to the rich but
they certainly are seldom familiar with the poor. Most
defendants charged with crimes of violence are poor,
uneducated, deprived, and segregated. Socially and
professionally, most psychiatrists are in the middle
class. Psychotherapy has been called the therapy of
communication. But many psychiatrists cannot communicate with those accused with crime-and too often
they lack the incentive to try.
Lack of knowledge is compounded by failure to admit ignorance. Doctors at one of our federal mental hospitals have often told me in private conversation that
they do not have adequate staff and time to make a thorough study of an accused person's mental condition.
Unfortunately, once transported to the courtroom they
try to live up to our expectations of them-they won't
admit that they do not have the answers for all the questions we ask. I sometimes feel that my psychiatrist friends
who embrace Durham and testify beyond their knowledge have done more to warp the Durham concept than
the conservative lawyers who oppose it.54
This latter point was echoed recently:
The sterility of the profession's response to Durham,
I now conclude, was due to the fact that its observance
was bound to make the psychiatrist's task in the courtroom much more demanding than before. The late Winfred Overholser, superintendent of St. Elizabeths, once
told me that the breadth of information I envisioned
being placed before the jury would require from 50 to
100 man-hours of interviewing and investigation; he
declared that a public hospital simply could not afford
it. If that were the case, I replied, psychiatrists should
frankly explain on the witness stand that their opinions
are thus qualified by lack of time and resources. It was
no service to the administration of justice for them to
create the false impression that they had learned subon the
stantially all that could be known about someone
55
basis of study they knew was inadequate.
51 Bazelon,Justice Stumbles on Science, 1 IRISH JURIST 273, 281-82 (n.s. 1966).
.5 Bazelon, supra note 13, at 20-21.
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Judge Bazelon's court has also discussed the issue of who can
testify about the facts of insanity. As far back as Carter it said:
In discussing as we have, expert medical testimony,
we have not overlooked the admissibility of lay testimony. Lay witnesses may testify upon observed symptoms of mental disease, because mental illness is characterized by departures from normal conduct. Normal
conduct and abnormal conduct are matters of common
knowledge, and so lay persons may conclude from observations that certain observed conduct is abnormal. Such
witnesses may testify only upon the basis of facts known
to them. They may testify as to their own observations
and may then express an opinion based upon those observations. Of course the testimony of a lay witness with
training in this or related fields may have more value
than the testimony of a witness with no such training.
Also obvious upon a moment's reflection is the fact that
while a lay witness's observation of abnormal acts by an
accused may be of great value as evidence, a statement
that the witness never observed an abnormal act on the
part of the accused is of value if, but only if, the witness
56
had prolonged and intimate contact with the accused.
These are sound distinctions, and they conform well to psychological realities. The observations of lay observers are not only
valid, but are very useful to corroborate or challenge the testimony of the psychiatric expert. Such lay observations should be
given exactly the weight set forth in Carter. Some courts have
lacked this kind of understanding, and have made a mockery of
the distinction between expert and lay testimony on the question
of insanity.

57

56 252 F.2d at 618.
5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carlucetti, 369 Pa. 190. 85 A.2d 391 (1952), where
lay witnesses testified 14 years after a crime that they had noticed nothing unusual
about the defendant. This was entered as rebuttal evidence against a psychiatric examination, made shortly after the crime, which described the defendant's psychotic
condition. In fact, at the time of the competency examination (which led to a 14 year
hospitalization), the psychiatrist noted that defendant's condition, which he called
dementia praecox, had also existed at the time of the homicides. In this case the verdict
of guilt and the death penalty were upheld by the Pennsylvania supreme court. See
also the dissent of Souris, J., in People v. Wingeart, 371 Mich. 264, 274, 123 N.W.2d
731, 736 (1963). The defendant's credibility was in issue, as it related to the defense
of insanity. The trial court's opinion was upheld in the Michigan supreme court, in
spite of the fact that all of the expert witnesses for both the prosecution and defense
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Judge Bazelon has also spoken on the closely related issue
of who should be allowed to testify as an expert witness when the
defense of insanity is raised.
In the Jenkins case, in 1962, spokesmen for the psychiatric profession betrayed a further misunderstanding
of the role of the psychiatric witness that must have been
widely shared among their colleagues. The trial court
in this case had excluded the testimony of highly qualified and certified clinical psychologists, on the ground
that "a psychologist is not competent to give a medical
opinion." In the appeal to our court the American Psychiatric Association supported the lower court's decision.
It asserted that in medical problems medical opinion
can be the only guide. It chose to overlook the fact that
the problem of criminal responsibility is not the exclusive
opinion for our court
terrain of psychiatry. I wrote the
58
rejecting such guild mentality.
Judge Bazelon is quite correct in his observation about the psychiatric profession on this point, and indeed the Association's
lawyer should have instructed them that it was settled, long before
Jenkins, that psychologists could testify on such matters. 59 As
Judge Bazelon has said, the opinion in the brief did tend to reflect the naive outlook of those members of the Association who
have had little direct contact with the questions of criminal responsibility. This attempt to limit the nature of expert testimony,
and its judicial rebuke, probably had at least a transient educational effect upon such members.
One of the principal criticisms which Judge Bazelon levels
at the psychiatric experts who testify on criminal responsibility
is that they tend to pre-empt the factfinding role. Despite a whole
series of admonitions in the60 cases before Brawner, the experts continued to make this error.
disagreed with it. Although it does not appear in the appellate opinion, the trial judge
also interposed himself as an expert in the interpretation of the defendant's Rorschach
responses. (This observation is based on the writer's personal participation in the case.)
'8 Bazelon, supra note 13, at 21-22. The case referred to is Jenkins v. United States,
307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
5. The naive attitude reflected by the amicus brief for the American Psychiatric
Association in Jenkins led this writer and others to urge that the organization in the
future refrain from filing such briefs. The large size of the organization and the
simple logistical difficulties of soliciting views from membership greatly potentiate
such ill-formed statements of position.
60 See, e.g., Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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The Brawner formulation was designed in large
part to end the expert's dominance over the question of
moral responsibility. Psychiatrists will nonetheless still
be able to take away the jury's function by presenting
conclusory testimony. Thus they will testify that the defendant lacked capacity "as a result," just as under Durham they testified to whether the act was "the product"
of a mental disorder.
Although no phrase will magically solve the problem of expert dominance, my own separate opinion in
Brawner suggested the jury be instructed that a defendant is not responsible "if at the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or behavior
controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot
justly be held responsible." This approach envisions that
the jury will be provided with a broad range of information about the accused from a variety of sources including but not necessarily limited to psychiatrists. Other
disciplines with special skills and knowledge in the field
of human behavior would not be precluded from the
opportunity to show the relevance of their data in the
courtroom. Moreover, experts will be less likely to address the ultimate issue:1 whether the accused can be
'justly held responsible."'
Judge Bazelon is much too sophisticated to believe that mere
reformulation of the test question will bring about the desired
changes in expert behavior. Though the majority opinion tends
to imply that the Brawner formulation (an adaptation of the ALI
standard for nonresponsibility) will bring about such changes,
there is an undercurrent of skepticism that runs throughout
Judge Bazelon's opinion, epitomized by his comment that "while
[e] generals are designing an inspiring new insignia for the standard, the battle is being lost in the trenches. '62 Judge Bazelon has
often stated that only a full awareness of the appropriate content
and purpose of psychiatric expert testimony can enable courts
to make proper use of it.
It is difficult to imagine that any body of law could more carefully delineate and explore the legal and social questions involved
in the insanity defense than that which was developed in the District of Columbia after Durham, under the leadership of Judge
61 Bazelon, supra note 13, at 21.
62

United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Bazelon. Notwithstanding the incisiveness and eloquence with
which these principles have been delineated, one has to conclude that in practice, their purposes have not yet been accomplished.
Psychiatrists testifying in the courts of the District of
Columbia have generally failed to live up to the challenge presented by Durham. The hundreds of transcripts
of trial proceedings I have read over the last ten years
force me to the conclusion that they have been unwilling
-or unable-to convey to the layman an understanding
of why the accused acted as he did. Their testimony is
frequently phrased in technical, stereotyped language
that is not only unintelligible to the jury but also a substitute for hard thinking about the dynamics of the defendant's personality and his life history.6 3
What has been true in the District of Columbia has also been
mostly true elsewhere. 64 Since this is the case, would it not be
logical to eliminate totally the defense of insanity?
It has long been apparent that the philosophy underlying
the insanity defense creates confusion regarding the goals of the
criminal law. From its beginning it created ambiguity in relation
to definitions of mens rea,65 and this confusion has only recently
been clarified in jurisdictions which have established a "bifurcated
trial" to deal with it.66 However, the basic problems raised can be
dealt with logically only with a fundamental alteration in the
whole structure of the criminal law and its sentencing procedures.
63 Bazelon, The Interface of Law and the BehavioralSciences, 271 NEw ENG J. MED. 1141,
1143 (1964). This was Judge Bazelon's Lowell Institute Lecture paper, given at the
Massachusetts General Hospital.
64 Diamond, describing the problems of M'Naghten for psychiatrists and expressing doubt that Durham will alter this state of affairs, believes that the only way in which
psychiatric evidence will improve is if it is utilized in relation to questions of mens rea.
He believes that this will solve the "all or none" quality of any insanity defense, which
adds to the confusion of psychiatric expert witnesses. See Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REV. 59, 66 (1961). Some of the tenor of this controversy may also be found in A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 12, at 102. I have had the opportunity to see, hear, and read the psychiatric testimony in many of these cases over
the years, and for the most part neither the experts nor the lawyers involved give much
indication of having learned the lessons of the Durham line of cases.
65
See Dixon, A Legacy of Hadfield, M'Naghten and Maclean, 31 AUSTR. L.J. 255 (1957).
Dix, Mental Illness, Criminal Intent, and the Bifurcated Trial, 1970 LAW

66 See, e.g.,

& Soc. ORDER 559 (1970); Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (1961); Comment, Psychiatry v. Law in the Pre-TrialMental Examination: The Bfurcated Trial and Other Alternatives, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 848-68
(1972).
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Such proposed changes have been well described by the British
criminologist Baroness Wootton and by the American criminol67
ogist Paul Tappan.
Several legally sophisticated psychiatrists have urged that
psychiatrists should withdraw completely from the trial aspects
of insanity and other psychological questions, and limit their participation to the posttrial sentencing and treatment aspects of the
criminal justice system. 68 This would cripple the insanity defense
and, in all likelihood, would lead to its elimination. Goldstein
and Katz analyzed abolishing the insanity defense altogether, and
arrived at a mixed conclusion. 69 I am of the opinion that unless
and until there is the kind of extensive remodeling of the criminal law suggested by Wootton and Tappan, the defense of insanity provides a useful window for the community into the nature
of the social and psychological problems it seeks to deal with
through the criminal law. If the defense is to fulfill this function,
psychiatric experts must continue to participate at the trial level.
The defense of insanity only rarely succeeds, and then hardly ever for purely rational reasons. More often than not, the
"craziest" people, who commit the most heinous acts, are the least
likely to be successful with the defense. They succeed in frightening the community so thoroughly that all of its atavistic and retributive impulses are mobilized fully, and a verdict of guilt generally results.
Even though the insanity defense fails in a given case, if the
defense is presented adequately the court and the community
are confronted with the nature of the psychological forces which
lead to criminal behavior. In this way, ever so slowly, the social
approach to deviance can change and, perhaps in a hundred
years or so, a rational theory for the treatment of deviants, such
as that laid out by Wootton, can become a reality.
As I read and reread Judge Bazelon's writings on the subject
of the insanity defense, I was curious about his views regarding
67

See P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE, CORRECTION (1960); B. WOOTTON, CRIME AND

THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963).
6 See S. GLUECK, CRIME AND JUSTICE

PSYCHIATRY

AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME

OF PUNISH-

248-80 (1936); S. HALLECK,
205-28 (1967); K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME

MENT 112-42 (1966); P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND (1958); T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC
JUSTICE (1965);

G.

ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND

PUNISH-

MENT (1954).

69 Goldstein and Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853

(1963).
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its future. Although I could find few explicit comments on this
point, it seems clear that he tends to see this defense as having
ongoing educational value to the community, notwithstanding
its logical incongruities. In speaking in general about the input of science to legal thinking in his Dublin address, Judge
Bazelon made the following comments:
For a lawyer and a judge, I have had a unique opopportunity to observe and participate in the discussions
of some of these scientists. The initial, albeit perhaps
misguided, enthusiasm of behavioral scientists for Durham either pulled or propelled me into their midst. I
have not yet extricated myself. So I sit by and hear scientists explain the discovery of the genetic code. I hear
them expound on the factors which affect how a human
being will develop even before he is born. At the same
time I learn that identical cells will react differently depending on the environment in which they are placed.
These sciences are now bringing in clues to even more
revolutionary findings, as far as ethics and law are concerned. The use of drugs to tranquilize, or otherwise to
influence the mind, will have far reaching implications
for our concepts of responsibility and justice.
Full of such facts and speculation, I come back from
meetings with scientific groups at the Salk Institute for
Biological Studies and various other institutions and I
try to concentrate on the cases which come before me
for decision. But I must forget most of what I learned
from the sciences of behavior when I judge the behavior
of the real human being who comes before our court.
I'm reminded of the story of the ancient king who
asked a fakir for the formula he was selling throughout
the kingdom for turning sand into gold. Realizing that
he had better not admit his fraud, the fakir said: "There
are ten steps which must be executed with absolute precision for success." Then he went on to explain that the
first step required a room with specifications in terms of
fractions of inches; and that each of the next eight steps
was increasingly precise and difficult. Then he said that
even if all nine instructions are followed, there could be
no success unless the last and tenth instruction was faithfully observed, namely, that while engaged in these difficult calculations "you must not think of a hippopotamus."
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The hippopotamus ruined a perfectly good recipe
for making gold out of sand. It seems to me that the
criminal law will find it harder and harder not to think
about the science explosion. I sometimes wonder how
long it will be before the orderly processes of the criminal law are shaken by our expanding knowledge of the
human being and his behavior. And I ponder over
whether the biochemist will fare any better in the courtroom than does his co-worker, the psychiatrist.
The relations between the individual and society
are too important to be left to the scientists alone. The
criminal law has a role to play. It enforces society's expectations. One might even say that the purpose of the
criminal law has been to administer the effects of our
disappointed expectations. The law has traditionally
sought to reduce the gap between society's expectations
and the incapacity for some to fulfill them by minimizing recognition of that incapacity. M'Naghten seems designed to do precisely this. We put our expectations in
one compartment and our learned sense of reality in another. There is little communication between the two.
We are fearful that explanation may be taken as absolution. Yet my contention is the opposite. For I contend
that personal responsibility is linked, indeed locked, to
understanding; and that expectations are altered by a
growing knowledge of the springs of human conduct,
so utilitarian morality will give way to a humane yet practical morality, based on such understanding. A serious
inquiry into the defendant's criminal responsibility can
70
provide the catalyst for change.
In his James Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law at New
York University in 1971, Judge Bazelon said, when talking about
the development of the law of insanity:
But all of this takes time. The issue of criminal responsibility takes more time to try in 1971 than it did in
1954 and is raised in more cases. We could return to our
old "efficiency" by shoving our problems back under
the rug. If we did that, we would not only be turning our
backs on whatever we may have learned in the past seventeen years, but would also be abdicating our most im70

Bazelon, supra note 54. at 283-84.
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portant role. For the heart of the judicial process is by its
very nature inefficient. The way towards "efficiency" in
the courts is not to shortcut judicial procedures in order to dispose of more cases in less time. Such a solution is equivalent to a surgeon's omitting time-consuming diagnostic procedures and simply operating at random on whatever patients are brought before him. He
could certainly process more patients this way, but few
of us would think his performance had been improved.
The way to make medical care more "efficient" is to
keep people from getting sick in the first place. And
the way to make courts more "efficient" is to deal
with
71
factors that cause people to commit their crimes.
Quite clearly, Judge Bazelon is willing to spend judicial time to
open up and clarify complex social and psychological issues. This
attitude about the nature of the judicial function is found over
and over again in his writings. For example, in his Lowell Institute Lecture of 1964 Judge Bazelon said:
The law's demands on psychiatry may seem less
onerous if the expert witness sees that his purpose is not
merely to testify but to educate-that he cannot really
accomplish one without the other-and if he sees that
the information he makes available to those who have
to pronounce a moral judgment is also to be used in later
72
rehabilitative efforts.
The conclusion would seem to be that Bazelon would not wish to
73
eliminate the defense of insanity, at least at the present time.
Before leaving the subject of criminal responsibility, I would
like to make some observations about the general effect which
Judge Bazelon has had on the psychiatric profession. Though
few psychiatrists are sophisticated about the law of criminal responsibility (and most share a substantial naivet6 about all law),
nearly all of them have heard of Judge Bazelon and have read
or heard his lectures. Whenever Judge Bazelon speaks at a psy7, Bazelon, supra note 24, at 660 (emphasis added).
72 Bazelon, supra note 63, at 1144.
7 He made the point in another lecture that we should not eliminate the defense,
because retaining it forces the community to examine the causes of crime, and therefore such psychiatric information belongs in the trial. "If we first find guilt and then
promise to provide treatment for the person in spite of his guilt, we turn away from
the question which should concern us most-the causes of criminal behavior." Bazelon,
The Future of Reform in the Administration of CriminalJustice, 35 F.R.D. 99, 112 (1964).
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chiatric meeting, his presentation must be scheduled for the longest hall available, and it will be packed. At.the very least these contacts have stirred interest in the relationships and obligations
of psychiatry to the legal process. The reasons for this are clear.
Judge Bazelon has done what every successful interdisciplinary
teacher must do; he has mastered the language of the listener.
Although his challenges are sharp and his criticisms often biting,
they have a sufficient ring of truth so that we must listen. Judge
Bazelon entered our arena through the issue of the insanity defense, a question with which we had some real or imagined familiarity. Since then, he has taken us into an ever-widening set of
legal-psychiatric issues. Partially because of this, the literature on
law and psychiatry has progressively moved away from the narrow focus of criminal law issues toward a multitude of new and
important social questions. The lessons and frustrations experienced while working with the insanity defense have already been
encountered in the newer areas of concern, and because of Judge
Bazelon's elucidations and admonitions perhaps some of the
earlier mistakes will be avoided.
C. The Right to Treatment
The concept of the involuntarily hospitalized mental patient's "right to treatment" was formulated first by Morton Birnbaum, 74 who set forth the notions that have now been elaborated
extensively and which are beginning to become the subject of
statutes 75 and judicial opinions. However, the first judicial consideration of the right to treatment question arose in Rouse v.
Cameron7 6 in an opinion written by Judge Bazelon in 1966. The
case involved a patient in St. Elizabeths Hospital who had been
civilly committed following a finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity. He received little help beyond what has come to be
known euphemistically as "milieu therapy.17 7 When this case
74See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
3 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.130(a) (1971); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1973).

7

76 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (right to treatment doctrine applied to juvenile homes).
77 Although this expression is now loosely used to describe any kind of inpatient
psychiatric treatment, its concepts of total psychological management of the hospital
environment were pioneered by Dr. Maxwell Jones and reported in M. JONEs, THE

THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY (1953).

His treatment groups included prisoners of war

and one made up of patients with "stress neuroses" induced by work in industry. The
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came to the Court of Appeals:
The American Psychiatric Association responded
to Rouse with an adamant statement of what I must call
professional mystique: "The definition of treatment and
the appraisal of its adequacy are matters for medical determination." This declaration ignored the explicit message in Rouse that the court does not presume to assess
the quality of anyone's performance, unless that performance is patently arbitrary and capricious. As in all
administrative law, the task of the court is to ensure that
the administrative process itself controls abuse of discretion, that a factual record is established, that alternatives are considered and that reasons for decisions are
set forth.
The instant opposition to Rouse was a clue to a deeper discordance between the professional and the judicial
outlook. Plainly the profession was blind to or was concealing the conflict between the imposition of treatment
and the human and civil rights of patients. In the
view of most members medical decisions are by definition made in the best interests of the patient. If a physician says a man is sick, he must be sick; if he says the
man must be treated or confined, that must be what is
best for him. Such bootstrap reasoning comes under
scrutiny only when, in the case of psychiatric prescriptions, it calls for involuntary treatment. The patient's
interest in release, in less restrictive confinement or in
adequate treatment 78cannot be matters solely "for medical determination.

treatment goal in these groups was to achieve a level of socially appropriate behavior
by means of learning from the totally managed environment, one which encompassed
work, ward maintenance, and recreation, as well as social role activities. Such a program also included the development of a ward governance body with a predominant
patient representation. These groups relied heavily upon patients helping each other
with staff acting mainly as guides and consultants. All activities are aimed toward helping patients learn skills for living in the community and not to adapt to the hospital.
Regrettably, as noted above, this treatment concept is often coopted and perverted
to label any institutional setting in which therapeutic change is allegedly sought; four
walls and a staff do not a therapeutic community make. It takes great sophistication
and therapeutic competence to facilitate and catalyze the development of a therapeutic
milieu or community; mere labeling, as always, will not suffice. See also M. Jones,
Therapeutic Community Principles, in II LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTALLY DISORDERED
OFFENDER 102 (L. Irving & T. Brelje eds. 1973).
78 Bazelon, supra note 13, at 22. This theme is also explored in Bazelon, The Right
to Treatment: The Court's Role, 20 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIAT. 129, 131 (1969).
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Rouse raised considerable controversy, and resulted in vigorous discussions between psychiatrists and lawyers over the issue of
legal intrusion into medical practice. This interchange has had
an excellent pedagogical effect upon the psychiatric profession,
and probably has also led to a deepening understanding on the
part of the legal profession about some matters concerning psychiatric practice. Many psychiatrists saw the court's action as an
ominous portent, an intrusion which would destroy the doctorpatient relationship and grossly inhibit the therapeutic process.
Since Rouse would be applied, however, primarily to patients in
large state institutions, where physicians tend to see their patients
briefly and at infrequent intervals, it is difficult to conceive that
such a result would be of any great consequence. In Judge Bazelon's words:
Bringing these matters into court does not impose
an artificial adversary relationship between the patient
and his keepers; it reflects an adversity that already exists. This proposition comes as a surprise, of course, to
the psychiatrist engaged exclusively in office practice
and to his voluntary patient. In the public sector the adversity of interests that confronts the psychiatrist and
his involuntary patient-although it does not encompass the entire relationship-must
be recognized as an
79
inescapable reality.
In another place he said:
Moreover, to the extent that the legislature commits the
community to providing treatment for patients involuntarily hospitalized for that purpose, precisely the same
considerations suggest that the legislature may also commit itself to provide the standards and machinery necessary to assure the reality of treatment.8 0
Rouse did not go far toward making these standards explicit.
However, in the Alabama case of Wyatt v. Stickney8 ' the Rouse goals
were resolved into three general criteria for establishing adequate
treatment: an environment which provides humanely for physi7' Bazelon, supra note 13, at 22.

s Bazelon, supra note 14, at 745.
s' 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971),final orders issued, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379
(M.D. Ala.), supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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ological and psychological needs; a minimally adequate staff;
and individualized treatment plans that set goals which are periodically reviewed. Bazelon anticipated these propositions in
two 1969 papers, 8 2 and urged them in testimony before the
Pennsylvania legislature when it was considering mental health
83
code modifications.
Judge Bazelon is acutely aware of the various social-psychological forces which must be dealt with when a question such as
right to treatment is approached:
The judicial need for a right to treatment arises
primarily because we have hundreds of thousands of patients residing-voluntarily or not-in state institutions.
In the vast majority of cases, even if we resist the temptation to call these unfortunates "prisoners," it is fairer
by far to refer to them as "residents" than as "patients."
Rare is the person with a physical ailment who remains a
hospital patient for years on end. While an equation between mental and physical illness is simplistic, any layman must view with skepticism the description as "patients" of persons who remain for years in our isolated,
often overcrowded public mental institutions. The fact
that such skepticism took so long to surface testifies to
the capacity we all share to mask harsh realities with
gentle words.
The public tolerance for euphemism may finally
have exhausted itself in this area. There are powerful
currents at work upon the entire structure of society's
s4
response to the mentally ill.
Judge Bazelon has often commented upon the dangers of
leaving this important set of questions to the mental health professionals alone. He notes that "[w]hereas peer review is a much
praised and not much observed principle of the medical profession, it has been largely foreign to the practice of psychiatry. ' 85
He made the same point in describing his visit to Russia to ob82 Bazelon, supra notes 14, 78. "The most important facet of the right to treatment
is not that the hospital does something for everyone, but that it does the right thing
for the right patient." Bazelon, supra note 14, at 746.
83 Bazelon, Rights of Mental Patients to Treatment and Remuneration for Institutional
Work: PriorCourt Decisions and Legislation, 39 PA. B.A.Q. 543 (1968).

84Bazelon, supra note 14, at 752-53.
85Bazelon, supra note 13, at 22.
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serve Soviet methods of psychiatric treatment.8 6 Since the time
of Judge Bazelon's visit, the Soviet government's utilization of
psychiatric hospitalization for political purposes has become more
visible and his warnings about the risks appear to have been sub87
stantiated.
Exploration of the medical, legal, and moral issues involved
in the involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill has received
much stimulation from Judge Bazelon. His continuing interest,
coupled with great psychological sophistication, has done much
to bring these important issues before the legal and psychiatric
professions as well as the public.
D.

CriminalLaw

Judge Bazelon's approach to criminal law problems is greatly
influenced by his conviction that society's first concern should be
to discover why a crime was committed, and not simply whether
or not to punish. He is not so much concerned about the number
of persons whom the law might find not responsible for whatever reason, but rather how any person who commits a criminal
act should be handled in order to minimize the likelihood of future criminal behavior. Thus he states:
[Some penologists] suggest that the proper place for the
consideration of complete psychiatric evidence is in and
after sentencing, not in the determination of guilt. Hold
the man responsible on the basis of M'Naghten; then remove the gag from medical testimony to decide what
treatment he needs. There is sweet reasonableness in
this view. And it has the added attraction of being easy.
It withdraws from the community a difficult and troubling issue. But that issue, in my judgment, is one which
the community has not only a right but a duty to consider. If we first find guilt and then promise to provide
treatment for the person in spite of his guilt, we turn
away from the question which should concern us most86See Bazelon, The Law and the Mentally Ill, 125 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 665, 669 (1968):
I was troubled by the assumption that the state has the right to intervene in the
lives of its citizens to make all of the decisions on health care. The Russian system, for all its accomplishments, depends upon and reinforces a social system
which is difficult for an American to accept.
87 For a psychiatrist's response to this practice, see Weinsten, Psychiatrists and Political Torture, 131 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 721-22 (1974) (letter to the editor).
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the causes of criminal behavior. That is the question toward which Durham is directed. Even if our prison system were transformed, I should still be opposed to finding guilt regardless of moral responsibility, on the theory
that the accused would be "treated" in prison. I think
the success of efforts to treat the individual offender depends on the community's awareness of his needs-of
how he came to act as he did. And the best available
means for generating such awareness is to provide as
much of this information as possible to the communityin-camera-to the jury, which will be forced to consider
it seriously if it is required to assess the defendant's responsibility. I want the public, and not just the professionals, to know what caused the accused's behavior, so
that they can have some idea of what is required not88only
for treatment but for the prevention of like cases.
In taking this view, he joins many behavioral theorists, 89 as well
as such unusual judges as the late Jerome Frank. 90
Fundamentally, Judge Bazelon always seeks to make the
criminal justice system more humane and responsive to the rights
and needs of individuals. He believes that a civilized society must
have a humane system for dealing with its deviants, or it risks an
erosion of all its human values. 91 He always favors these values
over any consideration of efficiency. 92 While readily conceding
the need for improving the courts' speed and effectiveness,
88 Bazelon, supra note 73, at 112-13.
8 See sources cited in note 68 supra. See also Watson, A Critique of the Legal Approach

to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 611 (1958).
90 See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1936).
1 See Bazelon, supra note 22, at 5:

Further, by advocating criminal justice reforms solely in the interest of crime
reduction, we lose sight of our legitimate interest in justice for its own sake.
Civilized society must have a humane criminal justice system which treats defendants with understanding and insight-regardless of how much or how little
that system affects the crime statistics.
Later, while speaking of the right to effective counsel, he said:
Good defense work may well take more of the court's time. That is the price
we pay for constitutional protections. If society believes in those protections,
it will have to pay the price in terms of increased expenditures for the criminal justice system.
Id. 24.
92 For a discussion dealing with some aspects of this issue, see Comment, Equal
Treatment in the Enforcement of the CriminalLaw: The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters, 56 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 498 (1965). A hair-raising description of a very "efficient" system of justice
may be found in A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GuLAG ARCHIPELAGO (1973).
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Judge Bazelon believes that "[i]t is a false efficiency indeed that
speeds up the criminal process in order to speed up an unrehabilitated defendant's return to the streets." 93 As he notes, "[i]nitially the tentacles of incipient totalitarianism seize only the scapegoats of society, but over time they may weaken the moral fibre
94
of society to the point where none of us will remain secure.
One aspect of Judge Bazelon's writings of particular interest
to a psychiatrist is the frequent recognition of the importance of
the psychological factors which underlie society's responses to
crime. He knows that these forces must be dealt with if any kind
of social change is to be effected. In the context of criminal law,
one of the most important factors is the emotion of aggression,
not only in the deviant behavior of defendants, but also in the
reactions of judges, juries, and lawyers, because of man's capacity
to identify with others. In one of his many references to this subject, Bazelon wrote:
Somewhat to my amazement, a few theorists of the
criminal law have now come out into the open and argued that besides its two generally accepted purposesreformation and deterrence-a third rationale of the
criminal law, vengeance, is also valid. Most of us still prefer to clothe our retributive instincts in the garb of deterrence. But we are being told that, since retribution
is a "natural" human instinct, it is right and necessary
for society to vent its feelings on the defendant. All agree
that the individual must not give way to these feelings.
He may not personally avenge a murder or even take
his own life. A life for a life is acceptable, it seems, only
if we all join in the taking. I hope the law has a less emotional, more rational and more moral base. True, we all
have aggressive, punitive urges. But should the criminal
law carry them out? Many people believe that international conflict begins with and feeds upon our aggressive
impulses but few would advocate war. Awareness of our
aggressive instincts should help us to95 refrain from aggression not to commit it collectively.
His court's awareness of this human capacity and its influence on
decisionmaking led to the development of the important rule of
93 Bazelon, supra note 24, at 665.
.q4 Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Civil Liberties, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 13, 28 (1964).
" Bazelon, supra note 73. at 107.
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Lyles v. United States 96 that the jury must be informed of the results of finding a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. Although he dissented from the holding in Lyles, Judge Bazelon
concurred in that portion of the opinion,9 7 observing that when
jurors do not know that such a person will be confined in a hospital until he is no longer dangerous, fear will mobilize all of their
self-protective punitiveness, which may then cause them to find
guilt. Although the precise nature of a jury's thought processes is
not known, the court's opinion is completely logical, and very likely this fear would operate in the jury's decisionmaking. Judge
Bazelon always comes back quickly to the absolute necessity of
ensuring that the legal system does not do avoidable and inappropriate harm to the individual.
In a sense the entire system of criminal jurisprudence
is "symbolic," since every part of it stands for something
more than itself, namely, the preservation of the worth
of each individual in a society of individuals. If we are
to be true to our heritage at the same time that we struggle with the problems which beset us, we must deter not
only crime, but also the debasement of the individual. 98
This quotation is a fitting summation of Judge Bazelon's views of
how the criminal justice system should work.
E. Juvenile Courts and Children
Through the years, Judge Bazelon has been closely involved
as both student and educator with various organizations concerned with children. In one of his most recently published papers he nicely summarized his views on the social, psychological,
and legal problems of the young. 9 9 In this lecture, presented at
the annual meeting of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, he warned child psychiatrists against falling into the same
social trap earlier encountered by adult psychiatrists-endeavoring to perform tasks and solve problems for which they had no
capacity. He argued that only if they avoided this temptation
could they fulfill the roles for which they were equipped, and at
,6254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en banc), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958).
, Id. at 734.
8

Bazelon, supra note 94. at 28 (footnote omitted).

""See Bazelon, "The Problem Child"-Whose Problem?, 13 J.
PSYCHIAT. 193 (1974).
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the same time keep the pressure on society to solve the causes of
maladjustment, delinquency, and poverty. 10 0 In this same lecture,
he delineated clearly the conflict of interest problems which often
beset psychiatrists when they work for a school, a hospital, or a
court, and are asked to make a diagnostic judgment about their
patient for the purpose of some legal disposition. 01 The point is
not a new one for Bazelon. He made it several years earlier in an
address to juvenile court judges:
First of all, immature and authoritarian parents use the
court's jurisdiction as a threat to hang over their children, a way to get out of their own obligation to work
with their children and even to "get their own way" in
a specific conflict with their children. The tired and apathetic ones readily abdicate their parental roles, simultaneously relieved and lulled by the promise 0 that
the
2
problem can be handled by the juvenile court.
Both of these admonitions are aimed at the much criticized
procedure of attempting to solve problems by applying a label.
Such facile maneuvers only serve to hide important matters
from view.' 03 At most they result in shuffling the child from
one inadequate evaluation agency to another and never get to
the issue of providing for his fundamental needs for help or
04
treatment.
One of the principal vents through which children are extruded into social limbo is a finding of truancy. All too often these
children have been left far behind in the academic wake of their
peer group because the schools did not identify and respond to
their specific deprivations and needs. Then, because they failed
to enjoy school and profit from it, they avoided the pain of their
scholastic humiliation, stayed out of school, and were expelled for
truancy. "To end this syndrome, we put them in institutions where
they usually get less schooling than if we had left them alone to
skip school intermittently. Our local detention home gives one
100He might also have added that this could help them avoid what happened to
the juvenile court movement with its promise of treatment and rehabilitation.
101Bazelon, supra note 99, at 195.
102 Bazelon, supra note 18, at 43.
103For a critique of such labeling by one of its most vociferous psychiatric opponents, see T. SZAsz, TuE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961). For a legal statement, see
Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
£04 See Bazelon, supra note 99, at 195.
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and one-half hours of schooling daily, and the regular public
school system doesn't even give credit for it.' 10 5 This leads Judge
Bazelon to conclude that it should not be possible to refer children out.of the school system, 10 6 a view that some school systems
at long last are beginning to adopt. In Michigan, for example,
school districts are now required to provide school facilities for
all children of compulsory school age, without regard to the nature or severity of their problems. 10 7 Many school districts will
resist such expensive alternative classroom programs. But the
higher cost of the alternative programs will probably increase the
pressure to keep children in the regular classrooms, which would
be all to the good. Over time this will necessitate different classroom approaches and an earlier diagnostic effort to locate the
children who are beginning to have problems, so that efforts can
be made to prevent those problems from growing.1 0 8 If the community is forced to take this direction, its own desire for good
education will press it toward getting children what they need
at the earliest possible moment. This will hopefully initiate movement toward the kind of dispositional test for all children with
problems proposed by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit-that of "the
least detrimental alternative available."'0 9 This standard, as they
point out so effectively, has the advantage of keeping decisionmakers fully aware that when they propose to provide a child with
anything other than a normal family setting, it will be no utopian
solution, but rather a choice between the least of the available
evils.
Judge Bazelon reserves some sharp criticism for the grossly
illogical decisions made about children in juvenile courts. In commenting on Morris Kent's case,"10 the first juvenile court case to
be considered by the United States Supreme Court, he observed:
So, without appointing a lawyer, without consulting
105Bazelon, supra note 18, at 44.
106 Id. 45.

'0'MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 340.771a (Supp. 1974).
108 This is what social psychiatrists call a "primary prevention" program. Such
programs are aimed at complete avoidance of an emotional problem. "Secondary prevention" is a program directed to limiting and curing an existing emotional problem.
"Tertiary prevention" is aimed at limiting the effects of an emotional problem. G.
CAPLAN, PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTIVE PSYCHIATRY 16-17 (1964).
1o9j. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 53-64 (1973).
110 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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Morris, or his family, the judge "waived" his court's jurisdiction over Morris so that he could be tried as an adult
criminal in the United States District Court. There, the
jury found him guilty of housebreaking and robbery,
although it acquitted him by reason of insanity on the
rape charges. This surprising verdict of simultaneous
responsibility and non-responsibility for his crime led to
a strange sentence. The criminal court judge sent Morris
to a mental institution until he could recover his sanity.
After that, when he had become a changed person, but a
person mentally qualified to pay penance for the crimes
of the previous person, he would serve a sentence of 30
to 90 years. 1 1 '
He urges upon the judiciary the same constraints he presses upon
the psychiatric profession-do not offer what you cannot provide
in regard to treatment, and at least provide children with the protection of due process so that they do not end up receiving the
worst of both the legal and the treatment worlds. 1 2 In the same
paper Judge Bazelon described what he flatly called bigotry,
an attitude he finds not uncommon in the judicial treatment of
juvenile offenders. He attributes such bigotry to the prevalent
class differences between juvenile court judges and the children
who appear before them. 13 He muses:
How can classism be combated? Not very well, by a
judge. Faced with the impossible problems of juvenile
offenders for whom no facilities are available, we can do
little more than beat our judicial breasts and try at least
to make the community realize what we are doing. This
may serve some purpose. One of the causes of class prejudice is the success with which the rich can ignore the
poor.... Perhaps judicial opinions, with the media coverage they sometimes receive, can do something to make

"IBazelon, Racism, Classism, and the Juvenile Process, 53 JUDICATURE 373, 374 (1970).
2judges cannot, by their own fiat, alter the environment that breeds juvenile
offenders, nor can they take even the less drastic step of hiring counselors or
constructing treatment facilities. Accordingly, if they see that young offenders
are not being helped, are not receiving the care and rehabilitation promised
them by the ideals of the juvenile system, their only alternative is to say, "If you
insist upon treating him as a criminal, at least give the young offender the protections an adult offender receives." In short, don't give him "the worst of
both worlds." Id. 375-76.
1Id. 377-78.
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realize what is hapthe prosperous public and legislators
14
pening and why in our cities.'
F. Summary
In this final quotation we again see how Judge Bazelon views
the judiciary as community educators, and how he constantly
works to bring critical issues before the public. He has devoted
great personal effort to this task, and his writings demonstrate
the breadth of his concerns.' 5 His efforts have been rewarded
by appointment to teaching positions on an ever-increasing number of both medical and law faculties. He has gained world-wide
acclaim as a leader in the effort to make intelligent use of our
growing knowledge of the behavioral sciences in the context of
law and social policymaking. These honors and that acclaim are
richly deserved.
1141d. 378.
11-1For his thoughts on other pressing social concerns, see Bazelon, Alcoholism:
An Ounce of Prevention, 52 JUDICATURE 408 (1969); Bazelon, Mental Retardation: Some
Legal and Moral Considerations,35 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 838 (1965).

